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Many observers argue that urban revitalization harms the poor, primarily by raising rents.  Others argue
that urban decline harms the poor by reducing job opportunities, the quality of local public services,
and other neighborhood amenities.  While both decay and revitalization can have negative effects if
moving costs are sufficiently high, in general the impact of neighborhood change on utility depends
on the strength of price responses to neighborhood quality changes.  Data from the American Housing
Survey are used to estimate a discrete choice model identifying households' willingness-to-pay for
neighborhood quality.  These willingness-to-pay estimates are then compared to the actual price changes
that accompany observed changes in neighborhood quality.  The results suggest that price increases
associated with revitalization are smaller than most households' willingness to pay for neighborhood
improvements.  The results imply that, in general, neighborhood revitalization is more favorable than
neighborhood decline.
Jacob L. Vigdor





For at least two decades, social science has lamented the decline of the economically 
integrated neighborhood.  The absence of higher-SES households from inner city neighborhoods 
has been blamed for a range of urban maladies, ranging from teen pregnancy and high school 
dropout rates to poor public services (Wilson 1987; Jencks and Mayer 1990; Ellen and Turner 
1997; Vigdor 2006).   The implication of much of this research is that urban decay, by 
contributing to reductions in quality of life, has a detrimental influence on those who remain in 
declining neighborhoods.
When the opposite of urban decline occurs, however, social scientists and community 
activists alike have often raised a completely different set of concerns.   In revitalizing 
neighborhoods, the primary concern is that poor renter households will be harmed by rising 
prices (Schill and Nathan 1983; Marcuse 1986; LeGates and Hartman 1986; Atkinson 2000; 
Kennedy and Leonard 2001).
1   From a naive perspective, it would thus appear that no 
neighborhood change is beneficial to the poor.  Basic economic theory suggests, however, that 
these tales of the costs of urban decline and renewal are not contradictory, rather they both 
ignore potential countervailing benefits – urban decay reduces prices, and urban revitalization 
restores quality of life.  Indeed, more recent evidence on gentrification suggests that the benefits 
exceed costs for the majority of affected households (Vigdor 2002; Braconi and Freeman 2004).
2 
The goal of this paper is to more formally ground these notions of costs and benefits in an 
1 It is generally presumed that owner-occupiers are insulated from rent increases, and benefit from revitalization 
through property value increases (Sinai and Souleles, 2005).  Some observers voice concern, however, that 
owners may suffer from large increases in property tax bills or may be at risk for property condemnation if 
revitalization is government-initiated.
2 These studies employ a form of revealed preference analysis to determine whether the benefits of gentrification 
exceed associated price increases, by studying the rate of residential turnover.  Both studies find lower rates of 
turnover in neighborhoods undergoing gentrification.
1economic model, and to empirically determine whether price changes associated with urban 
decay and revitalization are commensurate with the value that households place on neighborhood 
quality.
After a brief review of basic evidence on neighborhood dynamics in the United States, 
Section 3 presents a basic model of neighborhood choice, where neighborhoods vary in quality 
and housing prices adjust to reflect these quality differences.  So long as individual preferences 
obey a simple single-crossing property, it is straightforward to show that the impact of an 
exogenous change in neighborhood quality depends on the nature of price determination in 
equilibrium and the extent of moving costs.   When mobility is universally costless and 
equilibrium prices are constrained to exceed some absolute minimum in all neighborhoods, 
declines in neighborhood quality have a broad negative impact that extends beyond the decaying 
neighborhood itself.    When mobility is sufficiently costly for some group of agents, any large 
change in neighborhood quality, for better or worse, may have a negative impact on that group, 
particularly if they rent rather than own housing.   Ultimately, theoretical predictions are 
ambiguous, which implies that the question of whether decay or revitalization is more harmful is 
fundamentally an empirical one.
In practice, do equilibrium housing price changes in revitalizing neighborhoods render 
existing residents worse off?  In order to answer this question, it is necessary both to measure 
households’ willingness to pay for neighborhood quality and the impact of revitalization on 
prices. These two exercises are undertaken in Sections 4 and 5, utilizing longitudinal data on 
housing units derived from the metropolitan samples of the American Housing Survey (AHS). 
The analysis employs four proxy variables for neighborhood quality: binary indicators for 
2whether a survey enumerator noted abandoned housing within 300 feet of a sampled unit, an 
indicator for whether the enumerator observed houses with bars on the windows within the same 
radius, an indicator for whether the enumerator observed trash in the street outside the unit, and 
an indicator for whether the street itself was in disrepair.  In some specifications, factor analysis 
is used to combine these four factors into a composite neighborhood quality index.  Household 
valuations of neighborhood quality are then derived from a discrete choice conditional logit 
model of the decisions made by sample respondents who moved into their housing unit within 
the past year.  Results suggest that households are willing to pay between one and three percent 
of their annual income for a one-standard-deviation increase in neighborhood quality.  There is 
significant evidence of heterogeneity in this valuation.
The same AHS data are then used to determine the typical price changes associated with 
neighborhood decline and revitalization.   Consistent with the notion that the chosen quality 
indicators   distinguish  neighborhoods   at   the   low   end  of   the   distribution,   and  that   price 
differentials in those neighborhoods are determined by consumers with low valuation of 
neighborhood quality, price movements associated with quality movements tend to be small. 
Across the entire sample of three- to four-year intervals, price increases in revitalizing 
neighborhoods are statistically indistinguishable from those in neighborhoods of persistent low 
quality.  Point estimates suggest that the premium associated with revitalizing neighborhoods is 
on the order of one to five percent.  Point estimates also suggest that declining neighborhoods 
experience price decreases of similar magnitude.
To address the concern that observed indicators measure latent neighborhood quality with 
error,   additional   specifications   employ   an   instrumental   variable   strategy,   exploiting   the 
3availability of multiple correlated indicators of neighborhood quality in later AHS panels. 
Ordinary least squares estimates of neighborhood quality impacts are larger when the sample is 
restricted to these later samples, which might reflect the increased precision of instructions given 
to enumerators over time.  Point estimates from IV specifications are nearly identical to those 
from OLS, which suggests that attenuation bias is not a serious concern in the later AHS panels. 
The ultimate estimate of the impact of neighborhood revitalization on rents is 9%, a value that 
equates to the low end of the estimated willingness-to-pay distribution.  
The analysis concludes by directly imputing changes in utility for householders who 
persistently reside in neighborhoods undergoing decay and revitalization.   Imputed utility 
changes associated with revitalization are positive in the overwhelming majority of cases.  While 
it is quite possible that these computations are skewed by endogenous exit from neighborhoods 
on the part of households who expect to be worse off following a quality change, there is little 
evidence of selective out-migration from revitalizing or declining neighborhoods.
Section 6 offers concluding observations.
2. How widespread are decay and revitalization?
Social scientists have repeatedly documented the rise and decline of individual cities, and 
have similarly analyzed both the causes and consequences of metropolitan obsolescence. 
Histories of individual cities provide substantial insight into the factors that promote and retard 
decay (Glaeser 2003; Gyourko 2005; Glaeser 2005).   Though there are a few noteworthy 
analyses of individual neighborhoods (e.g. Gans 1962), the importance of idiosyncratic factors in 
their growth and decline, coupled with the comparative absence of longitudinal data, render such 
research efforts difficult if not impossible.
4The empirical analysis in this paper will focus on neighborhoods in one of eighteen US 
metropolitan areas included in a subset of American Housing Survey (AHS) metropolitan files. 
While the set of included areas is not necessarily representative of the entire country, it does 
incorporate a number of cities that underwent notable declines in the late twentieth century (e.g. 
Detroit, Newark, Philadelphia), cities that grew consistently over the same time period (e.g. Los 
Angeles, Phoenix, Tampa), and some that declined through the early part of the sample period 
before beginning an urban renaissance (e.g. Boston, San Francisco).
In these metropolitan areas, the AHS tracked two sets of housing units longitudinally, 
with one set observed in 1974, 1977 and 1981, and the second set observed in 1985, 1989 and 
1993.
3  These longitudinal observations permit the construction of variables measuring decay and 
revitalization   in   individual   neighborhoods.     While   AHS   enumerators   asked   household 
respondents many subjective questions about neighborhood quality, the enumerators themselves 
recorded a set of observations on the area immediately surrounding each sampled housing unit – 
either on the same street or within 300 feet – during each survey wave.
4  Among the enumerator-
coded variables is an indicator for whether there were abandoned housing units in the immediate 
vicinity of the sample unit.  This variable will serve as the primary indicator of neighborhood 
decline in the empirical portion of this paper.  Three additional enumerator-coded variables, also 
potentially indicative of decline, note whether nearby housing units have bars on their windows, 
whether the streets are in disrepair, and whether there is litter on the streets and sidewalks. 
These additional indicators are available only in the later AHS panel.  While these indicators are 
3 The second panel is available in only 11 of the 18 MSAs.
4 The “same street” criterion applied in 1974, 1977 and 1981; the “within 300 feet” criterion applied thereafter. 
As will be seen in Table 2, the result of this change is to reduce the frequency of observed changes in 
neighborhood quality.  Results reported below indicate that the change in methodology increased the signal-to-
noise ratio of these indicators.
5either dichotomous or trichotomous in nature, and may therefore overly simplify a complex 
phenomenon, they are relatively objective in nature and thus less susceptible to reporting bias. 
Moreover, they are recorded relatively consistently throughout the waves of the survey.
Table 1 reports sample proportions for the four enumerator-coded neighborhood quality 
variables.  Across all MSAs and all sample years, roughly 7% of all housing units were recorded 
as having abandoned housing nearby.  In the later AHS panel, 12% of all households had nearby 
buildings with bars on the windows; two-thirds of these had more than one such building nearby. 
More than a quarter of all housing units were located on streets that were in some state of 
disrepair, and a quarter were within 300 feet of an accumulation of trash.
Rough estimate of the correlations between these indicators, coding each trichotomous 
variable on a scale from 0 to 2, with 2 indicating the lowest degree of neighborhood quality, are 
uniformly positive and of a modest magnitude.   The street repair and trash accumulation 
indicators show the strongest correlation, at 0.41, while street repair is least correlated with the 
bars on windows measure, possibly because bars are most likely to appear in cities with 
moderate climates.  The remaining correlations are on the order of 0.2 to 0.3.
Beginning in 1985, the AHS supplemented enumerator-coded quality indicators with 
survey respondents' own assessments of the quality of their neighborhood, on a scale from 1 to 
10.   These self-assessments are most likely afflicted by Tiebout bias: individuals sort into 
neighborhoods that offer higher quality in their own estimation, which might differ substantially 
from the estimation of an impartial observer.  Nonetheless, it would be reassuring to know that 
residents tend to value the characteristics employed as proxy measures for neighborhood quality 
in this analysis.  Table 2 offers evidence to this effect, comparing the mean neighborhood rating 
6from respondents in neighborhoods with differing values for the enumerator-coded variables.
In each case, mean neighborhood ratings tend to be lower in areas coded more negatively 
by enumerators.  The gradient is particularly steep for the abandoned housing and trash-in-street 
indicators, where the difference between best and worst category translates into more than 2 
points on a ten point scale.  It is least pronounced in the case of street disrepair – much of the 
variation in road condition appears to be idiosyncratic and not necessarily related to latent 
neighborhood quality.   The presence of buildings with bars on windows is slightly more 
indicative of low quality ratings than street disrepair, but this indicator is substantially less 
informative than either the abandoned housing or trash in street measures.  Thus, each indicator 
is correlated at least to some extent with self-reports of neighborhood quality, but the degree of 
correlation varies.
5
The cross-sectional statistics reported in Table 1 give little sense of the degree to which 
neighborhood quality changes over time.  Table 3 provides basic information on the frequency of 
neighborhood transitions, defined as situations where enumerators record different values for an 
indicator in consecutive surveys.  Given the overall frequency of neighborhood problems as 
recorded in Table 1, the frequency of transitions is quite high.  The first two rows of Table 3 
report the marginal and conditional probabilities of decline and improvement.  Averaging across 
all time periods and MSAs, five percent of all neighborhoods witness the appearance of 
abandoned housing over three to four years.  Among neighborhoods that begin a time period 
with abandoned housing, more than 60% witness some improvement by the end of the period. 
This statistic is somewhat surprising, given the generally accepted notion that the renewal of 
5 This pattern corroborates willingness-to-pay estimates derived below: residential choice behavior is consistent 
with larger premiums for neighborhoods that lack abandoned buildings and trash in the streets, relative to 
premiums commanded by neighborhoods that lack bars on windows or streets in disrepair.
7urban neighborhoods is rare (see, for example, Berry 1985).  Aside from the conclusion that 
renewal takes place in the majority of decayed neighborhoods over any three-to-four year time 
period, there are two alternative explanations.  The first is that this quality measure is statistically 
noisy.  Enumerators may not consistently evaluate whether in fact there is abandoned housing 
within a given area.  The second is that this form of “renewal” occurs when abandoned units are 
demolished, possibly to be replaced with vacant lots.  Few would argue that such an occurrence 
truly constitutes revitalization.  Additional evidence presented in Table 3 addresses these two 
alternative interpretations.
Changes in the coding of neighborhood quality indicators other than abandoned housing 
are similarly common across survey waves in the later AHS panel.  According to enumerators, 
bars on windows appear in roughly 8% of neighborhoods at risk for them.
6  Street conditions 
worsen in 16% of all neighborhoods, and litter problems worsen in 13%.
7   The marginal 
probabilities of improvement in these conditions are comparable to the probabilities of decline, 
but the conditional probabilities are much higher.   Between 50 and 65 percent of those 
neighborhoods at risk for improvement in neighborhood conditions actually experience them, 
regardless of the measure used.   This evidence assuages concerns regarding the second 
alternative interpretation posed above – there is no obvious way that the removal of litter could 
be construed as a bad thing – but does little to address the first, as each of these measures is 
subject to similar concerns regarding statistical noise.  This poses particular concerns for the 
empirical work undertaken below, as willingness-to-pay estimates are derived from cross-
6 Neighborhoods at risk for bars on windows include those with either no or exactly one building with bars at the 
beginning of the interval.  Recall that two-thirds of housing units with barred windows nearby have more than 
one neighboring building adorned with them.
7 Neighborhoods at risk for worsening street or litter problems include those with at most minor problems at the 
beginning of the interval.  Relatively few neighborhoods are coded as having major problems.
8sectional analysis and the analysis of equilibrium responses to quality changes are derived from 
differenced models.  Attenuation bias might therefore lead to an underestimate of equilibrium 
price changes relative to willingness-to-pay.  An instrumental variable estimation strategy, where 
changes in some quality indicators are used as instruments for changes in others, will be 
implemented to address this concern.
The remainder of Table 3 breaks down the decline and revitalization indicators by time 
period and year.   To these extent that these indicators are informative, rather than simply 
reflecting statistical noise, they should provide evidence consistent with received wisdom on the 
varying fates of cities and changes in trends over time.  For example, Detroit should be a location 
marked by decline more than revitalization.
Generally   speaking,   these   statistics   offer   at   least   some   reassuring   evidence   that 
neighborhood change indicators are informative.   The “net” increase in abandoned housing, 
computed as the difference between the probability of decline and revitalization, is highest in 
cities   such   as   Detroit   (4   percentage   points)   and   Newark   (2.2   percentage   points),   and 
comparatively low in Sun Belt cities (0.1 percentage points in Phoenix and Tampa).   The 
appearance of bars on windows occurs more frequently in West Coast cities, but controlling for 
this regional effect, cities with more notorious crime problems do tend to witness bars on 
windows more often.
Changes in street disrepair and the presence of trash in the streets are more common than 
changes in the other quality proxy measures.  The marginal probabilities of neighborhood change 
are between two and four times larger for these indicators.  There are also some signals that 
neighborhood   quality   may   not   be   unidimensional.     For   example,   Minneapolis,   which 
9demonstrates very little fluctuation in abandoned housing or bars on windows, shows substantial 
evidence of net declines in street repair and litter.  Detroit, by contrast, manages to post very 
little net change in the street repair and trash in street measures, despite substantial evidence of 
growth in abandoned housing over time.  This variation across cities may reflect differences in 
government investment patterns across municipalities.  Local governments in the Detroit area 
may simply be more aggressive about patching potholes and cleaning up the streets.   This 
variation could also reflect differences in enumerator training or coding conventions across AHS 
sites.   The possibility that neighborhood characteristics are measured with error will be an 
important consideration in empirical analysis below.
Neighborhoods   undergoing   transition   are   clearly   not   representative   of   the   entire 
population.  Table 4 reports basic summary statistics for households in neighborhoods observed 
in the AHS metro samples, classified by whether the neighborhood subsequently underwent 
decline, revitalization, or no change in status, according to indicators of abandoned housing or 
bars on windows.   In the case of the bars on windows measure, neighborhoods undergoing 
transitions are further classified by whether that transition was rapid, a change of two coding 
categories in either direction, or moderate, signifying a change of one category in either 
direction.
Both declining and revitalizing neighborhoods are more disadvantaged than stable areas, 
according to a number of measures derived from AHS statistics on the households occupying 
sampled housing units.  Areas undergoing transition have median incomes 10,000 1993 dollars 
lower than stable neighborhoods.  Gross rents, which sum the amount paid directly to landlords 
with any tenant-paid utility costs, to adjust for situations where landlords pay these costs directly, 
10are correspondingly lower as well.  Transitioning neighborhoods have a higher proportion of 
black and female householders, slightly larger household sizes, and lower home ownership rates.
The ex ante differences between declining and revitalizing neighborhoods are generally 
more subtle than the differences between transitioning and stable areas.  This is consistent with 
the   notion   that   the   indicators   of   neighborhood   quality   used   here   distinguish   among 
neighborhoods that are generally at the low end of the quality distribution.   Along several 
dimensions, however, evidence suggests that low-quality neighborhoods about to undergo 
revitalization are slightly better off than higher quality neighborhoods about to undergo decline. 
Household incomes tend to be a bit higher, female-headed households are slightly less prevalent, 
and home ownership rates are slightly higher.  These observations provide some reassurance that 
the neighborhood quality measures used in this analysis provide some informational content.
3. Theoretical model
3.1 Basic setup
Suppose households receive utility from housing h and neighborhood quality q.
8  Quality 
varies continuously in a set of  n [1, ∈ N] neighborhoods, and the supply of housing in each 
neighborhood is fixed.
9  The price of housing in neighborhood n=1 is normalized to equal unity, 
and the prices in all other neighborhoods vary to equilibrate supply and demand for housing in 
each neighborhood.
10   This assumption is not innocuous; the consequences of selecting other 
8 The addition of a numeraire commodity to the model does not influence the basic logic behind the results. 
Readers accustomed to seeing numeraire commodities in models of this type might imagine that utility takes the 
Cobb-Douglas form, which makes the omission of a numeraire here completely inconsequential.
9 Allowing elastic housing supply does not change the basic outcome of the model.
10 It is conceivable that conditions of excess supply may exist in certain neighborhoods.  Reductions in demand for 
a certain location are generally not accompanied by reductions in supply, at least in the short-to-medium term 
(Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).  The presence of safety and tenants' rights regulations in the housing market may lead 
some landlords to refrain from allowing tenants to occupy a housing unit rather than lease it at market rates.  There 
may also be scenarios where housing remains vacant even when local rent levels effectively fall to zero.
11normalizations will be discussed in more detail below.   Households choose a location to 
maximize 
(1) max ( , )
, h n
n U h q
subject to the budget constraint
(2) p
nh ≤ y.
In this scenario, a marginal increase in a neighborhood’s quality, other things equal, will 
increase households’ willingness to pay for housing in that neighborhood, with the exact amount 
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where p without the n superscript denotes willingness to pay rather than a market equilibrium 
price.  In general, willingness to pay for neighborhood quality is high when the marginal utility is 
high relative to the marginal utility of housing, is lower for households that consume more 
housing, and is higher when housing prices are higher.









It follows from (3) that households with a stronger preference for neighborhood quality will have 
a higher willingness to pay for that commodity, other things equal.  Thus, the price mechanism 
will generally encourage the sorting of consumers with stronger tastes for quality (high-α types) 
into higher quality neighborhoods.  In the spirit of Epple and Romano (1991), which defines 
12equilibrium as a scenario where no household wishes to move and there is neither excess demand 
nor supply for residence in any neighborhood, necessary conditions for equilibrium in this model 
consist of the following:
a) Neighborhoods are perfectly stratified; that is if any preference types α1 and α2 reside in the 
same neighborhood, then all types on the interval [α1, α2] also reside in that neighborhood.
b) Associated with each neighborhood n [2, ∈ N] is a boundary type, Bn, who is exactly indifferent 
between neighborhoods  n  and  n-1.   With the normalization of prices in neighborhood 1 
mentioned above, prices in the n-1 other neighborhoods are determined by these indifference 
constraints.
c) There is assortative matching between households and neighborhoods.  Formally, if αi is the 
highest value of α in neighborhood i and αj is the highest value in neighborhood j, qi>qj if αi>αj. 
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that pi>pj as well.
3.2 Effect of urban decline, under assumptions
Figure   1   graphically   depicts   equilibrium   in   this   context,   in   price-quality   space. 
Neighborhoods are indexed in order of increasing quality; the relation between quality and price 
is determined by the indifference curves of boundary types.  Price-quality combinations yielding 
higher utility are those towards the lower and right sides of the graph.  In this figure, indifference 
curves have been plotted as straight lines for simplicity, an innocuous assumption since the 
measurement of quality is arbitrary.  This discussion will also make the simplifying assumption 
that households’ demand for housing is fixed, or at least relatively price insensitive.  While this 
assumption  is  less  innocuous  than  the first,  relaxing  it does not  substantially alter  the 
13conclusions.  Finally, the supply of residential units in each neighborhood is presumed to be 
fixed.  In the long run, one might expect that higher-valued neighborhoods would become more 
densely populated or replicated.  The net effect would be to reduce observed price differentials 
over time.
The weakest preference for neighborhood quality belongs to a household having the 
indifference curve marked  B1  – this household is completely indifferent to quality.   Such a 
household naturally sorts into the neighborhood with lowest quality.   All households with 
indifference curves steeper than  B1  but less steep than  B2  also sort into this lowest-quality 
neighborhood, paying the equilibrium price p1.  The household with indifference curve B2 is 
exactly indifferent between (q1, p1) and (q2, p2).
11   Similarly, the household with indifference 
curve B3 is indifferent between (q2, p2) and (q3, p3).  Households with indifference curves steeper 
than B2 but less steep than B3 sort into neighborhood 2.
In   this   setup,   it   is   straightforward   to   show   that   an   exogenous   decrease   in   one 
neighborhood’s quality results in lower utility for all households who strictly prefer that 
neighborhood or any neighborhood with higher quality.  Figure 2 illustrates the impact of such a 
shock.  When quality in neighborhood 2 declines from q2 to q2', prices must decline in that 
neighborhood in order to maintain household B2's indifference between neighborhoods 1 and 2. 
Note that for any resident of neighborhood 2 with indifference curves steeper than B2, the shift 
from equilibrium point (q2, p2) to (q2', p2') leads to a decrease in utility.
The decline in q2 breaks household B3's indifference between neighborhoods 2 and 3. 
With a fixed housing supply in each neighborhood, equilibrium is restored through an increase in 
11 Note that given the assumption of a fixed supply of housing in each neighborhood, the identity of boundary 
households is determined by the distribution of preferences in the population.
14prices in neighborhood 3, brought about through a bidding-up process instigated by households 
with indifference curves only slightly less steep than  B3.   This increase in  p3  breaks the 
indifference between neighborhoods 3 and 4 for household B4, which in turn leads to an increase 
in p4.  Thus in a city with N neighborhoods arrayed in order of quality, a quality decline in 
neighborhood n leads to a price decrease in n and increases in the N - n neighborhoods with 
higher quality.
12
In this scenario, the projected impact of an exogenous increase in neighborhood quality is 
the simple reverse of the impact depicted in Figure 2.   Prices increase in the improving 
neighborhood, however utility increases for all households in that neighborhood except the 
boundary household.   Prices decline in neighborhoods with quality levels higher than the 
improving neighborhood.
3.3 Extensions: relaxing assumptions
The scenario displayed in Figure 2 and described above maintains certain severe 
assumptions: that the supply of housing is fixed in each neighborhood, and each households’ 
demand is fixed.   By neglecting potential wealth effects, the scenario also assumes that all 
households are renters and that housing is owned by absentee landlords.  The assumption that 
prices are bounded from below is also potentially controversial.   Finally, by assuming that 
households are freely able to arbitrage differences in living standards across neighborhoods, the 
scenario ignores the potential impact of moving costs.  This section examines the consequences 
of relaxing each of these assumptions.
12 One would expect that in the long run, supply responses would reduce the size of neighborhood 2 and increase 
the size of neighborhoods 3 and 4 relative to the initial equilibrium.  The implications of allowing variable 
supply are discussed in the following section.
15Allowing demand and supply to vary.  When housing demand and supply vary, changes 
in neighborhood quality may also bring about changes in neighborhood capacity.  Increases in 
quality, by raising prices, lead households to consume less housing and producers to supply 
more.  Conversely, reductions in quality, which lower prices, will lead towards increases in per-
household consumption of housing and lower supply. Changes in neighborhood quality should 
thus covary positively with population growth.
Relaxing the fixed demand and supply assumptions implies that the identity of boundary 
households is not necessarily fixed.  In declining neighborhoods, reductions in population imply 
that the range of households located in the declining neighborhood will shrink: referring to 
Figure 2, the boundary household determining p2' will have an indifference curve steeper than B2. 
The boundary household determining p3' will have an indifference curve less steep than B3.  The 
net impact will be to slightly raise p2' and to lower p3' (and by extension new equilibrium prices 
in all higher quality neighborhoods).  The main welfare result from the basic analysis continues 
to hold: quality decline in neighborhood n harms all those in neighborhoods from n to N.
13 
Quality increases have the opposite effect.
Incorporating ownership.  So long as quality changes are persistent, the asset value of 
houses in declining neighborhoods should reflect declines in rents.  Owner-residents of declining 
neighborhoods thus experience negative wealth effects in addition to negative impacts on 
consumption, magnifying the net impact of the decline.  Wealth effects negate the impact of 
decline in neighborhood n on owners in areas ranked above n, however.  For these households, 
the present value of the stream of rent increases brought about by flight from the declining 
13 The exception to this conclusion would be if supply in each neighborhood were completely elastic.  This 
scenario is inherently uninteresting as it implies that all individuals (except perhaps those completely indifferent 
to quality) would sort into the highest-quality neighborhood, and no price premium would be supported.
16neighborhood is exactly offset by increases in assets.   Similarly, revitalizing neighborhoods 
convey duplicative benefits on owner-residents in those neighborhoods.
Changing the normalization of prices.   The conclusions of this analysis are highly 
sensitive to the assumption that prices in all neighborhoods are constrained to be at or above 
some   minimal  level.     Together   with  the   standard   Epple   and  Romano-style   equilibrium 
conditions, this implies that the price response an increase in quality in any neighborhood is 
determined by the preferences of the neighborhood resident with the least valuation of quality. 
The assumption that land prices are bounded from below, either by the constraint that prices may 
not be negative, or by the presence of agricultural rents to land, is quite common in urban 
economics.   Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider the potential impact of alternative 
assumptions.
If prices are constrained to be below some ceiling level in all neighborhoods, then the 
price response to a quality change in a neighborhood is determined by the resident with the 
highest valuation of quality.  When the quality of neighborhood j declines, prices fall far enough 
to render most residents better off rather than worse off.  Prices do not adjust, and hence resident 
utility is not impacted, in neighborhoods ranked above j in the quality distribution.  Prices fall in 
neighborhoods ranked below j, as residents of those neighborhoods are drawn to the superior 
price-quality offering in j.
From a relative standpoint, the model's predictions are not sensitive to assumptions 
regarding price normalization.  Neighborhood decline is relatively more advantageous to those 
who place little value on quality; revitalization is conversely more advantageous to those who 
value quality highly.  The absolute implications, by contrast, are starkly different.  Expectations 
17regarding the impact of neighborhood quality changes on welfare depend significantly on one's 
priors regarding the nature of equilibrium price determination across neighborhoods.  While it is 
certainly more common to assume that prices are bounded from below, the question of whether 
quality changes are positively or negatively correlated with welfare changes is fundamentally 
empirical.
Introducing mobility costs.  Even maintaining the assumption that prices are normalized 
so that the minimum exceeds some threshold, introducing mobility costs can weaken the model's 
predictions.  Note that in the scenario depicted in Figure 2, under assumptions maintained in 
section 3.2, there is no mobility in the transition from one equilibrium to another.   Thus, 
introducing some forms of mobility costs – for example, costs that affect only a subset of the 
population – may have a minimal impact in this scenario.  Mobility costs could theoretically 
influence the pace of transition to long-run equilibrium in a model with flexible demand and 
supply, but such transition costs would not fundamentally alter the model's predictions.
A   more   interesting   scenario   arises   when   mobility   costs   are   substantial   and   a 
neighborhood undergoes a large change in quality.   Figure 3 depicts a case where one 
neighborhood   “leapfrogs”   another,   with   the   net   impact   of   changing   the   rank   order   of 
neighborhoods by quality.   Note that the modeled quality change is positive in this case: 
neighborhood 2 experiences an increase that leaves it ahead of neighborhood 3.  In a frictionless 
world, much mobility between neighborhoods two and three would ensue.  In the special case 
where the neighborhoods were of equal size, and supply and demand were fixed, the populations 
of the two areas would trade places.  In the presence of mobility costs, some households may 
become “trapped” in their initial neighborhood.  In Figure 3, residents of neighborhood 2 whose 
18initial indifference curve traveled through the triangular shaded area are at risk for being made 
worse off by neighborhood improvement.  This cone is bounded below by household B2, and 
above by the household exactly indifferent between (q2, p2) and (q2', p2').  These households 
value the increase in neighborhood quality at or below the change in market price.  They also at 
least weakly prefer (q3', p3') to (q2, p2).  These households will suffer a net loss if their cost of 
switching from neighborhood 2 to neighborhood 3 exceeds the gain from relocating to a superior 
price/quantity combination.
In the presence of mobility costs, then, it is conceivable that both decay and revitalization 
could lead to reductions in utility for certain residents of urban neighborhoods.  This scenario is 
most likely to apply to renters facing high mobility costs in areas undergoing particularly stark 
changes in neighborhood quality.  
In the end, theoretical arguments leave a substantial amount of uncertainty regarding the 
impact of neighborhood quality changes on welfare.   It is fairly clear that the impact is 
heterogeneous: owners and those who value quality highly are most likely to benefit when the 
quality of their own neighborhood increases; renters and those who value quality least are least 
likely to benefit.  Renters who face high moving costs are likely to be harmed by substantial 
quality changes in either direction.  The sign and magnitude of these welfare changes is difficult 
to ascertain without making more specific assumptions regarding the magnitude of moving costs 
and the nature of price determination in equilibrium.
Theory thus leaves several empirical questions to be addressed.   How much are 
households with varying observable characteristics willing to pay for neighborhood quality? 
How much do prices change in neighborhoods that decline or revitalize?  How do these price 
19changes compare with willingness to pay?   Is there any evidence that individuals become 
“trapped” in revitalizing areas, where price increases exceed their estimated willingness to pay 
for improved neighborhood quality?
4. The valuation of neighborhood quality
Suppose households i choosing among available housing units j have a utility function of 
the following form:
(5)U Y r X ij i j i j ij = - + + a b e ( )  ,
where Yi represents the household’s income, rj indicates the rental price of the unit in question, 
and Xj is a vector of housing unit and neighborhood characteristics.
14  Note that the vector β is 
presumed to vary across households.  The error term εij represents an idiosyncratic household- 
and choice-specific shock to utility.   When the error terms are independent and identically 
distributed across choice alternatives, following an extreme value distribution, and households 
systematically select the alternative that maximizes Uij, the conditional logit procedure can be 
used to identify the parameters α and β.  In most specifications below, elements of β will be 
estimated as linear functions of observed household characteristics.
A common obstacle in consumer choice models of this type is the correlation of price 
with unobservable components of quality.  In the presence of such a correlation, estimates of the 
coefficient on post-rent income, α, will be biased downwards: households will appear to 
frequently choose more expensive housing units with little to offer in terms of observed 
14 Note that this formulation treats income as exogenous to location choice.  Some models, such as the spatial 
mismatch hypothesis (Kain, 1968), suggest that income is a function of location.  Indeed, Vigdor (2002) posits 
that improved job opportunities form one potential benefit of neighborhood revitalization.  Recent evidence, 
much of it derived from randomized mobility experiments such as the Moving to Opportunity program, suggest 
that the effect of location choice on earnings is insignificant (Orr et al. 2003).
20amenities.  Ferreira (2005) offers a means of circumventing this bias, by introducing a situation 
where two households may face different prices for the same housing unit.   The source of 
variation are amendments to California’s constitution, which allow certain households to move 
while retaining the property tax bill associated with their previous residence.   In models 
presented here, Ferreira’s estimate of α will be imposed as a parameter restriction.  Effectively, 
these models will assume that Ferreira’s estimate is free of the bias typically associated with 
estimation of such parameters.
15
The relevant sample for the conditional logit estimates presented here consists of all 
renter households in our AHS samples who report having moved into a housing unit within the 
year prior to their interview.  The potential choice set for each household is comprised of those 
AHS rental units in the respondent’s MSA listed as vacant or having turned over in the past year. 
For purposes of analytical tractability, the choice set includes only a random sample of ten 
unchosen alternatives. Specifications control for the probability that a housing unit was included 
in the choice set, constraining the coefficient on this probability measure to equal one 
(McFadden 1978).
The vector Xj consists of housing unit characteristics and characteristics of the relevant 
AHS “zone.”  The AHS zone contains roughly 100,000 residents and can be mapped relatively 
reliably into Census geography.
16   While coefficients on household characteristics, including 
15 In practice, conditional logit estimates of this equation that do not impose the Ferreira constraint produce 
coefficients that are uniformly much closer to zero, consistent with the presence of omitted variable bias. 
Readers inclined to discount the importance of omitted variable bias may think of willingness-to-pay values 
derived from the constrained estimates to be lower bounds.  As will be seen below, the lack of a strong 
association between neighborhood quality and price trajectories implies that this paper's substantive conclusions 
are not sensitive to the values generated by the willingness-to-pay exercise.
16 Zone characteristics are only available in the AHS enumerations  of 1985 and later.  This constraint is only 
binding in the case of the abandoned housing measure, since the other enumerator-coded variables are also 
unavailable before 1985.
21income, cannot be identified in a conditional logit framework, interactions between household 
characteristics and housing unit characteristics can.   These interactions operationalize the 
parameter heterogeneity implied in equation (5).
Table 5 presents selected coefficient estimates from conditional logit specifications.  In 
addition to the variables listed here, each specification controls for a set of housing unit 
characteristics, including the number of bedrooms, whether the unit is detached, and a 
categorical control for the decade in which the unit was built.  These structural characteristics as 
well as AHS zone characteristics are fully interacted with household characteristics in the model. 
The five specifications examined in Table 5 focus on five different proxies for neighborhood 
quality: the four enumerator-coded indicators discussed above, as well as a composite index 
derived through factor analysis.
17   The enumerator-coded indicators are each transformed into 
binary indicators, combining the minor and major problem categories.
The first set of coefficient estimates in Table 5 examines the probability of selecting a 
housing unit that is in close proximity to abandoned housing.  There is significant evidence of 
heterogeneity in the valuation of this measure of neighborhood quality.  Among other things, the 
coefficients suggest that neighborhood quality is a normal good, as willingness to pay to avoid 
abandoned housing increases, albeit slightly, with income.  More educated householders also 
display a tendency to avoid neighborhoods with abandoned housing, other things equal. 
Willingness to pay for this measure of neighborhood quality is lower among nonwhite 
householders, younger householders, and householders with children, other things equal.  
17 Factor analysis reveals that the four enumerator-coded variables load onto exactly one factor with an eigenvalue 
in excess of 1.  No other factor has an eigenvalue greater than 0.07.  The factor loadings are all in the same 
direction, implying that the factor can reasonably be considered to represent neighborhood quality.  Note that the 
quality index is reverse-coded, with higher values indicating lower quality.  The index has a mean of zero and an 
observed standard deviation of 0.75.
22Table 6 uses the coefficient estimates provided in Table 5 to estimate households’ 
marginal willingness to pay to avoid housing in neighborhoods with nearby abandoned units. 
These estimates are expressed on an annual basis, in 1993 dollars.  The degree of heterogeneity 
in willingness to pay is substantial: the value of a relatively high-income white household is 
more than twice that of a more moderate income nonwhite household with similar family 
structure and education.   The willingness-to-pay numbers are fairly substantial relative to 
income, equivalent to between 3 and 5% for each of the household types listed.  Given the 
limited number of additional neighborhood characteristics included in the conditional logit 
specification, the abandoned housing measure is almost certainly standing in for a number of 
other neighborhood amenities, local public goods and services, or housing unit attributes.  Bear 
in mind, however, that any such attributes loaded on to the abandoned housing measure must be 
orthogonal to average income and education levels in the unit's AHS zone.
The remaining specifications in Table 5 repeat this exercise, replacing the abandoned 
housing measure of neighborhood quality with the three other enumerator-coded variables as 
well as the composite neighborhood quality index.  Entries in Table 6 reveal similar patterns in 
willingness-to-pay   across   the   five   measures   of   neighborhood   quality.     In   each   case, 
neighborhood quality is estimated to be a normal good, with a doubling of income associated 
with an increases in willingness-to-pay on the order of 50%.   Less educated and nonwhite 
householders show less demand for quality, other things equal; older householders will pay a 
slightly higher premium for quality, other things equal.  Householders living with children show 
a greater propensity to avoid neighborhoods with bars on windows, but are less averse to other 
manifestations of low quality.  In general, abandoned housing and the presence of trash in the 
23street are characteristics eliciting the strongest avoidance responses, which corroborates the 
earlier finding that these indicators are most strongly associated with survey respondents' own 
assessments of neighborhood quality.  A unit increase in the neighborhood quality index, which 
corresponds to roughly 1.3 standard deviations, is associated with reductions in willingness-to-
pay of 1 to 3 percent of annual income.
5. How do actual price changes compare with estimated valuations?
Evidence to this point suggests that the valuation of neighborhood quality is substantially 
heterogeneous.  As discussed in Section 3 above, it is not inherently clear which valuation should 
matter most when neighborhood quality changes.  This section presents evidence on the actual 
impact of quality changes on market prices.
18
Table 7 presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions where the unit of 
observation is the rental unit/time interval
19.  The dependent variable is equal to the change in the 
logarithm of gross rent for the unit.  Each specification controls for time period fixed effects as 
well as MSA fixed effects, to eliminate any MSA- or time period-specific trends in rents.  The 
specifications include a binary indicator for whether the unit was located in a low-quality 
neighborhood at the beginning of the time period.  In the first four specifications, initial quality is 
low if enumerators coded at least a minor problem along one of the four standard dimensions.  In 
the final specification, initial quality equals the initial value of the neighborhood quality index.
The independent variables of interest are controls for whether neighborhood quality 
18  Evaluating the effect of neighborhood quality change on observed prices to estimated valuations may give an 
inaccurate picture of the change in well-being  residents experience if prices are trending upwards or downwards in 
the remained of the metropolitan area.  An actual evaluation of the impact of quality change on resident utility based 
on repeat observation of AHS renter households appears in Table 9 below.
19 In the abandoned housing specification ,time intervals include 1974-77, 1977-81, 1985-89, and 1989-93.  In the 
remaining specifications, only the 1985-89 and 1989-93 intervals are used.
24improved or worsened over the four-year interval.  In the first four specifications, these control 
variables  exploit   the  trichotomous  nature  of   the  underlying  quality  indicators.     Thus  a 
neighborhood in the low initial quality state may transition in either direction, if in the initial 
period the enumerator coded only a “minor” degree of street disrepair or litter in the street, or 
spotted only one abandoned housing unit or one unit with bars on the windows.  In the final 
specification, the change in neighborhood quality index is effectively interacted with an indicator 
for whether that change is for the better.
While the results vary in terms of the impact of initial quality on subsequent rent changes, 
point estimates are consistent regarding the impact of quality changes on rent changes.
20  These 
point estimates are generally not statistically significant, however.  Taking them at face value, 
they suggest that improving neighborhoods do tend to post higher rent increases than other 
neighborhoods that begin at a low level of quality, and declining neighborhoods exhibit a 
decrease in rents.  The estimated effects, in addition to being statistically insignificant, are of 
relatively modest magnitudes.   Relative to other initially low-quality neighborhoods, for 
example, point estimates suggest that rents in neighborhoods where bars disappear from nearby 
windows increase by an average of 4.5%.  With average monthly rent levels just over $500 in 
low-initial-quality neighborhoods, this suggests that revitalization is associated with annual price 
increases on the order of $300 in 1993 dollars.  Referring to Table 6, this figure is well within the 
range of  marginal willingness-to-pay estimates.
21
20 In three of five specifications, the impact of initial quality on subsequent rent growth is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  Units located in neighborhoods where streets are in need of repair show a 
significant tendency to decline in price over the subsequent four-year period, while units in neighborhoods with 
trash in the street tend to increase in price over the subsequent period.
21 Note that this example refers to the specification with the largest point estimate, and the quality indicator with 
the lowest reported marginal willingness-to-pay estimates in Table 6.  Coupled with the statistical insignificance 
of the result, it would be inappropriate to conclude that this estimate implies that neighborhood quality 
improvements leave some households worse off.
25As discussed in section 2 above, these neighborhood quality indicators are best thought of 
as noisy indicators of a latent neighborhood quality variable.  These specifications operate with 
first-differenced versions of these indicators, which will tend to amplify attenuation bias 
associated with measurement error.  The true impact of neighborhood quality change on prices 
could conceivably be larger than what is estimated here.
The final specification in Table 7 addresses this concern to some extent by employing the 
neighborhood quality index, which incorporates information from multiple signals of the latent 
variable.  If each of the four signals were independent of one another, use of a weighted sum 
could potentially increase the signal-to-noise ratio.  It is possible however, that the errors in 
variables are correlated with one another, as they are all based on the observations of a single 
enumerator.
Table 8 presents a second method for addressing the potential for attenuation bias, 
instrumental variable analysis.  In this case, changes in one neighborhood quality indicator, the 
presence of abandoned housing, are instrumented for with changes in the other three indicators. 
The analysis rests on the assumption that changes in the three other indicators should not 
influence growth in rents except through their impact on latent neighborhood quality, which the 
instrumented variable presumably also measures with error.  If the measurement error in each 
neighborhood quality indicator were classical, this method would produce unbiased estimates of 
the impact of neighborhood quality changes on rent changes.   For reasons discussed in the 
preceding paragraph, along with the fact that the quality indicators are discrete in nature, 
measurement error is not likely to be classical in this case.  Under certain assumptions, however, 
OLS and IV coefficient estimates can be considered bounds on the true parameter when 
26measurement error is non-classical (Black, Berger and Scott, 2000).
The first column in Table 8 shows the results of an OLS specification linking changes in 
the abandoned housing indicator to changes in log gross rent.  Somewhat surprisingly, the impact 
of quality changes is estimated to be positive and significant in this specification, which also 
includes controls for time period and MSA fixed effects, as well as two binary indicators for 
initial presence of one or multiple abandoned housing units.  In part, this discrepancy can be 
attributed to changes in the specification.  This model estimates one quality change parameter 
rather than two, effectively constraining the effect of decay to be the opposite of the effect of 
revitalization.  This model also excludes data from the 1974-1977 and 1977-1981 time periods. 
As discussed previously, the instructions to enumerators were different in these earlier time 
periods.  Enumerators were asked to indicate whether abandoned housing was located on the 
same street, rather than within 300 feet.  Summary statistics in Table 3 show that the frequency 
of neighborhood quality transitions was correspondingly larger in the earlier period relative to 
the late period.  This evidence is consistent with the notion that the abandoned housing variable 
is a noisier indicator of neighborhood quality in the earlier period, owing to ambiguity in the 
radius of reference.
The point estimate suggests that rents rose an average of 9.1% in neighborhoods 
undergoing revitalization, relative to other neighborhoods in the same initial quality state.  Initial 
quality has a strong association with price changes as well.  With average rent levels just over 
$500, this implies a relative increase of nearly $600 in equilibrium annual rent levels.  Compared 
with the marginal willingness-to-pay estimates in Table 6, this value appears somewhat modest.
Instrumental variable estimates of the relationship between neighborhood quality changes 
27and   rent   changes,   though   estimated   quite   imprecisely,   are   remarkably   similar   to   OLS 
specifications.
22  The IV estimate of the impact of neighborhood quality change on rent change is 
higher than the OLS estimate, which would be expected if attenuation bias were a concern, but 
the difference between coefficients is nearly imperceptible.  The results suggest that attenuation 
bias is a serious concern in the earlier AHS panels, but not a significant impediment in the later 
period.
Overall, the regression results suggest that willingness-to-pay for neighborhood quality 
improvements tends to exceed the price changes associated with such improvements.  Regression 
analysis necessarily obscures variation in the experiences of individual households in individual 
neighborhoods.  Is there evidence that some households experience decreases in utility when 
their neighborhood revitalizes?  Do households predicted to have a low willingness to pay for 
neighborhood quality display a propensity to exit when their neighborhood revitalizes?   Do 
households predicted to highly value neighborhood quality tend to exit when neighborhoods 
decline?  The remainder of the evidence presented here addresses these three questions.
For individuals that remain in the same housing unit between two AHS waves, it is 
possible to directly predict changes in utility.  Table 9 reports the results of such an exercise, 
which amounts to reporting the change in predicted value derived by a representative conditional 
logit specification.
23   The table reports the mean change in predicted value, by neighborhood 
quality trend, as well as the proportion of estimated utility changes that are positive, for renters in 
22 The first stage fit is quite good in this model.  Change in bars on windows has a t-statistic of 19.5, change in 
street disrepair has a t-statistic of 5, and change in trash in street has a t-statistic of 8.25.  It is thus unlikely that 
the IV estimates are subject to bias associated with weak instruments.
23 These predictions are derived from a conditional logit specification where both abandoned housing and bars on 
windows appear as choice-specific characteristics, and utilize potentially time-varying characteristics of 
households.  Alternative sets of predictions, holding household characteristics constant and equal to their first-
period values, produces similar conclusions.
28the second of the two AHS metro longitudinal datasets.
24
In general, the results of this analysis confirm the intuition generated by a simple 
comparison of willingness to pay to observed changes in rent.  The highest mean changes in 
utility are experienced in revitalizing areas, the lowest in declining neighborhoods.   Utility 
changes are comparatively modest in stable neighborhoods.  In general, utility changes tend to be 
more positive in the latest time period covered in this analysis, between 1989 and 1993.
There is considerable heterogeneity in the utility changes predicted for individual 
households in the AHS sample, driven primarily by variation in rent changes for individual 
housing units.  In stable neighborhoods, roughly 60% of all households have positive predicted 
changes in utility, averaging across both time periods and all available cities.  In neighborhoods 
marked by the disappearance of abandoned housing, 80% of all households had positive 
predicted changes, while only 30% of households in areas where abandoned housing appeared 
had positive predicted changes.  Using the bars-in-windows criteria produces somewhat less 
stark contrasts, but utility changes continue to be more reliably positive in revitalizing areas.
While it is not accurate to state that no households suffer decreases in utility in 
revitalizing neighborhoods, households forced to choose one of these three states of nature from 
behind a “veil of ignorance” would almost certainly choose revitalization if it appeared in their 
choice set.  Neither stability nor decline offer any assurances against utility-decreasing increases 
in rent.
This analysis could be misleading if the set of individuals who remain in declining or 
revitalizing  neighborhoods   is   not  representative  of   the  entire  population  in  those  areas. 
24 Recall that this represents the time period where measurement error in neighborhood quality does not appear to 
be a severe issue.
29Revitalization may look positive, for example, because all those individuals with negative 
predicted utility changes exit the neighborhood.   Tables 8 and 9 address this concern by 
analyzing   mobility   patterns   among   households   initially   located   in   neighborhoods   that 
subsequently experienced decline or revitalization, respectively.
Table 8 presents coefficients derived from probit specifications that examine the 
propensity for AHS renter households to exit their residence between consecutive waves of the 
survey.  The sample is restricted to households initially residing in neighborhoods at risk for 
decline, according to the abandoned housing criterion in the first specification and the bars on 
windows criterion in the second.   The specifications control for a number of householder 
characteristics, an indicator for whether the neighborhood exhibits decline between survey 
waves, and interactions between the decline indicator and the various household characteristics. 
Coefficients on main householder effects are omitted from the table.
25
Generally speaking, these specifications provide little in the way of consistent evidence. 
Interaction terms in the two specifications, which employ different definitions of neighborhood 
decline, are often of opposite sign.  Of the sixteen interaction terms presented in the table, three 
attain some level of statistical significance.   In all three cases, these statistically significant 
coefficients   have   opposite-sign   counterparts   in   the   alternative   specification.     The   most 
appropriate conclusion to take away from this evidence is that there are no robust, strong 
associations between household characteristics and responses to neighborhood decline.  It is 
interesting to note, however, that the three statistically significant coefficients all present 
evidence consistent with the willingness-to-pay exercise above.   Households with children 
25 The main effects reveal that female-headed households, nonwhite households, households with children present, 
married-couple households, and households headed by older, more educated, and higher-earning householders 
are less likely to move out of a rental unit between survey waves.
30generally have lower willingness-to-pay to avoid abandoned housing, and those households are 
also relatively less likely to depart when abandoned housing appears in a neighborhood. 
Willingness-to-pay for neighborhood quality tends to rise with education, and more educated 
householders show a relatively high propensity to move out of neighborhoods when bars appear 
on windows.  It thus appears that selective attrition from declining neighborhoods may lead to an 
understatement of the negative effects of decline in Table 7.  But this evidence is far from strong.
Table 9 offers an analogous set of results, examining the propensity to move out between 
survey waves among those individuals in neighborhoods at risk for revitalization.  The smaller 
sample sizes in these specifications reflect the smaller number of neighborhoods in this state at 
any one point in time.  Once again, there is little evidence of any systematic pattern in these 
results.  Of the sixteen displayed interaction terms, only one attains statistical significance.  That 
result   suggests   that   college-educated   householders   are   more   likely   to   exit   low-quality 
neighborhoods when a sign of revitalization – the removal of bars on windows – is observed by a 
survey enumerator.   There is little evidence, in particular, that those households with low 
willingness-to-pay for neighborhood quality show a disproportionate tendency to exit when 
quality increases.
To summarize the results of this exercise, most evidence points to the existence of 
accelerated rent growth in neighborhoods undergoing revitalization, and to relative rent declines 
in neighborhoods experiencing decay.  Estimates suggest, however, that the magnitude of these 
price movements is small relative to the distribution of willingness-to-pay for neighborhood 
quality.  Predicted utility changes for householders in revitalizing neighborhoods are much more 
likely to be positive than predicted utility changes for householders in stable or declining 
31neighborhoods.  This evidence is consistent with the notion that equilibrium price differentials in 
low-quality neighborhoods are determined by households with a relatively low valuation of 
quality.
6. Conclusions
Could a rational householder truly oppose both neighborhood decline and neighborhood 
improvement?  It is relatively easy to construct a theoretical model that predicts opposition to 
one trend or the other.  By incorporating moving costs, it is also possible to construct a model 
that predicts opposition to all forms of neighborhood change.  The question of which model is 
most likely to hold in reality is fundamentally empirical.
Discrete choice analysis of household location decisions shows that individuals do place 
a value on neighborhood quality, and there is significant evidence of heterogeneity in this 
valuation.  Household will pay a sum on the order of several hundred 1993 dollars to avoid 
residing in a housing unit with abandoned housing nearby.  More generally, estimates suggest 
that households will pay between 1 and 3 percent of their annual income for a neighborhood 
roughly one standard deviation higher in latent quality.  Estimates imply that this willingness to 
pay is significantly lower for certain types of households, including those with low incomes, 
less-educated heads, or children present.
Households could be harmed by revitalization if associated price increases exceed their 
willingness-to-pay.  Specifications exploiting the longitudinal nature of the AHS reveal that there 
is some price appreciation associated with quality improvements, but the average price increase 
is modest relative to the distribution of willingness-to-pay.  Direct prediction of utility levels for 
long-term   neighborhood   residents   are   much   more   likely   to   be   positive   in   revitalizing 
32neighborhoods than in declining ones.
The term “gentrification” has negative, even alarming, connotations in some urban areas. 
The evidence provided here suggests that those who fear neighborhood revitalization have made 
a basic error of attribution, by associating it with price increases that appear more strongly linked 
to other, albeit not fully identified, market forces.
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35Table 1: Summary statistics for enumerator-coded neighborhood quality variables, AHS
Indicator Sample proportion, all 








(on same street pre-1984; 
within 300 feet thereafter)
6.9% 0.31 0.21 0.32
Bars on windows of at 
least one building within 
300 feet
12.1 
(8.1% more than one) 0.16 0.29
Minor or major repairs 




Minor or major 




Note: sample proportion calculations exclude observations coded “not applicable” or “not 
answered.”  For puproses of computing correlations, the bars on windows, streets in disrepair, 
and trash in street variables are coded on a 0, 1, or 2 scale, with 2 indicating more than one 
building with bars on windows, major repairs needed, or major accumulation of trash, 
respectively.
36Table 2: Comparing enumerator- and respondent-coded neighborhood quality









more than one 6.81 
Streets in disrepair
no repair needed 8.05 
need minor repair 7.37 
need major repari 7.27 
Trash in street
none 8.19 
minor accumulation 7.00 
major accumulation 6.02 
Note: Source is AHS samples from 1985 and later.
37Table 3: Neighborhood decline and revitalization in a set of American cities
Percent of neighborhood/time period 
observations exhibiting decline based on:
Percent of neighborhood/time period 















probability 4.8% 7.0% 15.5% 13.0% 3.90% 5.5% 17.1% 15.1%
Conditional 
probability 5.2 7.7 16 13.4 61.7 50.0 64.4 60.7
Marginal Probabilities:
By time period
    1974-1977 5.9 --- --- --- 4.4 --- --- ---
    1977-1981 4.7 --- --- --- 4.5 --- --- ---
    1985-1989 3.7 8.1 16.7 14.8 2.2 5.5 17.5 15.7
    1989-1993 2.4 5.1 17.6 13.5 2.8 5.5 16.3 14.1
By city
    Anaheim 1.4 --- --- --- 1.3 --- --- ---
    Boston 5.7 3.4 15.0 10.9 4.1 1.9 21.9 15.9
    Dallas 3.9 6.5 9.6 8.4 3.6 5.7 24.9 20.8
    Detroit 10.3 7.8 22.2 13.7 6.3 7.8 21.2 13.1
    Fort Worth 3.5 7.1 15.5 10.2 2.9 5.4 18.3 18.6
    Los Angeles 4.1 17.4 25.2 27.7 5.8 11.0 11.1 15.1
    Minneapolis 2.0 1.0 24.8 20.5 2.0 0.8 15.3 13.1
    Newark 6.7 --- --- --- 4.5 --- --- ---
    Orlando 4.3 --- --- --- 3.9 --- --- ---
    Philadelphia 5.7 9.8 16.4 15.8 5.1 7.4 19.4 16.0
    Phoenix 3.8 7.6 11.4 13.5 3.7 6.2 11.0 11.7
    Pittsburgh 6.0 --- --- --- 4.9 --- --- ---
    San Francisco 5.0 11.6 18.7 17.0 2.9 9.0 13.1 15.6
    Spokane 2.9 --- --- --- 3.8 --- --- ---
    Tacoma 4.4 --- --- --- 3.6 --- --- ---
    Tampa 1.9 5.6 10.4 10.3 1.8 4.5 15.6 14.8
    Washington 4.9 6.1 14.1 11.1 3.5 5.0 16.0 14.9
    Wichita 3.0 --- --- --- 3.6 --- --- ---
Note: Indicators of decline and revitalization are based on enumerator-coded variables in the AHS.  Prior to 1984, 
enumerators were instructed to code conditions in the area “on the same street” as the sample unit.  After 1984, this 
definition changed to “within 300 feet.”  Marginal probabilities show the proportion of all housing units that 
transition from one state to another between survey waves.  Conditional probabilities show the proportion of 
housing units with the potential to decline (revitalize) that actually decline (revitalize) between survey waves.
38Table 4: A comparison of conditions in declining, revitalizing, and stable neighborhoods
Summary statistic





























Median income (1993 
dollars)
$26,370 $38,119 $27,496 $30,284 $30,820 $41,406 $32,877 $32,292
Median gross rent 
(1993 dollars)
$410 $509 $407 $509 $517 $590 $512 $498
Mean household size 2.88 2.78 2.92 2.63 2.65 2.55 2.58 2.54
Percent black 37.3 10.2 35.8 34.9 32.8 8.7 34.4 36.6
Percent female-headed 
households
23.6 10.7 19.3 22.3 22.3 12.5 21.0 22.3
Home ownership rate 43.6 60.4 47.8 42.0 45.6 56.6 46.5 43.8
N 9,101 171,508 7,406 2,253 3,534 43,800 2,764 1,641
Note: Abandoned housing statistics are based on observations from 1974, 1977, 1985, and 1989.  Bars on windows statistics are based on 
observations from 1985 and 1989.  A “rapid” decrease (increase) is defined as progressing from more than one (no) nearby house(s) with bars on 
windows to none (more than one).  A “moderate” increase is defined as progressing from zero to one, or from one to more than one; moderate 
decreases are defined analogously.  Statistics are based on the characteristics of households occupying AHS sample units.
39Table 5: Conditional logit coefficient estimates
Independent variable











Annual rent (in 1993 dollars) -2.11 -2.11 -2.11 -2.11 -2.11
Neighborhood quality proxy (NQP) -254.7 
(5.785)
443.7 676.3 1091.6 493.12
(3.799) (2.538) (2.139) (1.773)
Nonwhite householder*NQP 1231 
(2.446)
740.1 218.8 593.14 612.89
(1.494) (1.362) (1.661) (1.079)
Family income*NQP -0.06 
(1.1*10
-4)





Householder's age*NQP -7.76 
(0.070)
-6.56 -14.21 -21.13 -12.02
(0.069) (0.048) (0.030) (0.033)
Presence of children under 18*NQP 700.1 
(2.407)
-147.9 110 440.7 244.5
(1.834) (1.633) (1.397) (1.253)
Householder has HS diploma*NQP -1102 
(2.947)
-876 -647.7 -1335.3 -818.28
(2.101) (1.433) (1.461) (1.084)
Mean family income in zone -0.03 
(2.3*10
-4)





Percentage of adults w/ HS diploma in zone -2623 
(23.96)
-2768 -2470.1 -1746 -2251.12
(25.56) (21.39) (16.8) (17.67)
Percent nonwhite in zone -8381 
(10.05)
-8847 -8796 -8290 -8489.17
(9.322) (9.66) (7.896) (7.71)
Structural characteristics controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Structural/household characteristic 
interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zone/household characteristic interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 403,671 403,671 396,551 411,520 387,060
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Unit of observation is the household/choice alternative.  Estimates pool 
observations across three waves of AHS metro data, from 1985, 1989, and 1993.
40Table 6: Implied marginal-willingness-to-pay (per year) for neighborhood quality, 1993 dollars
Household characteristics












Age 30, income $30,000, white, no 
children, HS graduate 1533.14  524.87 457.97 912.26 736.28
Age 30, income $60,000, white, no 
children, HS graduate 2314.02  752.03 727.73 1409.18 1148.02
Age 30, income $30,000, white, no 
children, HS dropout 1011.61  110.29 151.44 280.31 349.02
Age 30, income $30,000, nonwhite, no 
children, HS graduate 950.56  174.60 354.42 631.55 446.22
Age 30, income $30,000, white, 
children, HS graduate 1201.81  594.86 405.92 703.69 620.57
Age 60, income $30,000, white, no 
children, HS graduate 1643.33  617.97 659.73 1212.26 906.94














Low initial quality -0.027 -0.021 -0.037 0.081 0.002
(0.109) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010)
Neighborhood quality indicator 
declines
-0.013 -0.026 -0.028 -0.025 -0.003
(0.008) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006)
Neighborhood quality indicator 
improves
0.006 0.045 0.013 0.034 0.006
(0.014) (0.031) (0.021) (0.021) (0.007)
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.042 0.056
no. of observations 57,205 13,743 13,527 14,079 12,253
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Unit of observation is the housing unit/time interval, 
where time intervals are based on repeat observations in AHS data.
42Table 8: IV estimate of the impact of quality change on rent change
Independent variable
Quality indicator: abandoned housing
OLS IV








Multiple abandoned housing units 
present in initial period
-0.202 -0.204
(0.033) (0.08)
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes
year fixed effects Yes Yes
R-squared 0.041 0.041
no. of observations 12,978 12,978
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Unit of observation is the housing unit/time interval, 
where time intervals are based on repeat observations in AHS data.  The instrumental variable 
specification employs changes in three other neighborhood proxy variables – bars on windows, 
streets in disrepair, and trash in street – as instruments for changes in abandoned housing.  The 
change in neighborhood quality indicator is coded such that improvements in quality are 
positive and reductions in quality are negative.
43Table 9: Predicted changes in utility for “stayer” households
Abandoned housing criterion Bars on windows criterion
Declining Revitalizing  Steady Declining Revitalizing  Steady
All cities, all periods
   Mean -1946 2380 413 -225 835 383
   Proportion positive 0.28 0.81 0.59 0.42 0.67 0.6
   N 167 110 2925 332 264 2606
1985
   Mean -1555 3224 -18 -271 589 -57
   Proportion positive 0.31 0.86 0.51 0.39 0.65 0.51
   N 127 50 1840 243 152 1622
1989
   Mean -3189 1677 1144 -97 1169 1109
   Proportion positive 0.18 0.77 0.73 0.52 0.7 0.74
   N 40 60 1085 89 112 984
Note: Utility predictions are based on conditional logit models incorporating heterogeneity in the valuation of neighborhood quality 
attributes, and controlling for both abandoned housing and bars on windows.  Utility comparisons are made only for renter 
households.
44Table 10: Who exits declining neighborhoods?






































Note: Table entries are probit coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.  Sample consists of renter 
households observed in the 1985 and 1989 waves of the American Housing Survey metro data in 
neighborhoods at risk for decline.  All specifications include main effects for each household 
characteristic listed.
45Table 11: Who exits revitalizing neighborhoods?












































Note: Table entries are probit coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.  Sample consists of renter 
households observed in the 1985 and 1989 waves of the American Housing Survey metro data in 
neighborhoods at risk for revitalization.  All specifications include main effects for each household 
characteristic listed.
46Figure 1: Equilibrium with four neighborhoods of varying quality.
47Figure 2: Transition to a new equilibrium following a decrease in quality in neighborhood 2.
48Figure 3: Transition to new equilibrium when neighborhood 2 “leapfrogs” neighborhood 3.  Households 
with indifference curves initially falling in the shaded region are at risk for utility declines in the presence 
of mobility costs.
49